Cyberwar Lessons from the War in Ukraine – Schneier on Security

Cyberwar
Lessons
from
the
War
in
Ukraine

The
Aspen
Institute
has
published
a
good
analysis
of
the
successes,
failures,
and
absences
of
cyberattacks
as
part
of
the
current
war
in
Ukraine:
“The
Cyber
Defense
Assistance
Imperative
­
Lessons
from
Ukraine.

Cyberwar
Lessons
from
the
War
in
Ukraine

The
Aspen
Institute
has
published
a
good
analysis
of
the
successes,
failures,
and
absences
of
cyberattacks
as
part
of
the
current
war
in
Ukraine:
The
Cyber
Defense
Assistance
Imperative
­
Lessons
from
Ukraine
.”

Its
conclusion:

Cyber
defense
assistance
in
Ukraine
is
working.
The
Ukrainian
government
and
Ukrainian
critical
infrastructure
organizations
have
better
defended
themselves
and
achieved
higher
levels
of
resiliency
due
to
the
efforts
of
CDAC
and
many
others.
But
this
is
not
the
end
of
the
road—the
ability
to
provide
cyber
defense
assistance
will
be
important
in
the
future.
As
a
result,
it
is
timely
to
assess
how
to
provide
organized,
effective
cyber
defense
assistance
to
safeguard
the
post-war
order
from
potential
aggressors.

The
conflict
in
Ukraine
is
resetting
the
table
across
the
globe
for
geopolitics
and
international
security.
The
US
and
its
allies
have
an
imperative
to
strengthen
the
capabilities
necessary
to
deter
and
respond
to
aggression
that
is
ever
more
present
in
cyberspace.
Lessons
learned
from
the
ad
hoc
conduct
of
cyber
defense
assistance
in
Ukraine
can
be
institutionalized
and
scaled
to
provide
new
approaches
and
tools
for
preventing
and
managing
cyber
conflicts
going
forward.

I
am
often
asked
why
where
weren’t
more
successful
cyberattacks
by
Russia
against
Ukraine.
I
generally
give
four
reasons:
(1)
Cyberattacks
are
more
effective
in
the
“grey
zone”
between
peace
and
war,
and
there
are
better
alternatives
once
the
shooting
and
bombing
starts.
(2)
Setting
these
attacks
up
takes
time,
and
Putin
was
secretive
about
his
plans.
(3)
Putin
was
concerned
about
attacks
spilling
outside
the
war
zone,
and
affecting
other
countries.
(4)
Ukrainian
defenses
were
good,
aided
by
other
countries
and
companies.
This
paper
gives
a
fifth
reasons:
they
were
technically
successful,
but
keeping
them
out
of
the
news
made
them
operationally
unsuccessful.

Sidebar
photo
of
Bruce
Schneier
by
Joe
MacInnis.

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