Remotely Stopping Polish Trains – Schneier on Security

Remotely Stopping Polish Trains
Turns out that it’s easy to broadcast radio commands that force Polish trains to stop:

…the saboteurs appear to have sent simple so-called “radio-stop” commands via radio frequency to the trains they targeted.

Remotely Stopping Polish Trains

Turns out that it’s easy to broadcast radio commands that force Polish trains to stop:

…the saboteurs appear to have sent simple so-called “radio-stop” commands via radio frequency to the trains they targeted. Because the trains use a radio system that lacks encryption or authentication for those commands, Olejnik says, anyone with as little as $30 of off-the-shelf radio equipment can broadcast the command to a Polish train­—sending a series of three acoustic tones at a 150.100 megahertz frequency­—and trigger their emergency stop function.

“It is three tonal messages sent consecutively. Once the radio equipment receives it, the locomotive goes to a halt,” Olejnik says, pointing to a document outlining trains’ different technical standards in the European Union that describes the “radio-stop” command used in the Polish system. In fact, Olejnik says that the ability to send the command has been described in Polish radio and train forums and on YouTube for years. “Everybody could do this. Even teenagers trolling. The frequencies are known. The tones are known. The equipment is cheap.”

Even so, this is being described as a cyberattack.

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.

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