Australia and the US should give ANZUS teeth and make it a deterrence network

As Canberra and Washington pass the 75th anniversary of the Australia, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) Treaty – New Zealand’s participation was suspended in the mid-1980s over its nuclear-free legislation – sentimentality is colliding with reality. The assumption of an automatic security blanket has evaporated, dismantled by China’s rapid military expansion and a US foreign policy expecting allies to shoulder far more weight. To survive this shift, Canberra and Washington should pivot ANZUS from a passive safety net into a deterrence network that is open to other partners and built around hardware that can be deployed quickly.
The compounding pressure of growing Chinese strength and an increasingly transactional US foreign policy is mounting. At the same time, Australia’s National Defence Strategy warns that a ‘strategic risk window’ is already open. Though not officially defined, this warning signals a period of heightened danger before AUKUS nuclear submarines arrive in the 2030s. What’s more, the US midterm election results could lead to legislative friction and budget scrutiny, underscoring the urgency for AUKUS to demonstrate immediate, tangible results across political cycles.
Canberra, therefore, cannot afford to wait for hardware that takes years to build: it should prioritise capabilities deployable today. Fortunately, the Shangri-La Dialogue’s announcement of the first AUKUS Pillar Two signature project for uncrewed submarines proves that this pivot is achievable.
Operationally, the alliance is tight, with US Marines rotating through Darwin and joint naval maintenance at Perth’s HMAS Stirling laying the groundwork for Submarine Rotational Force-West.
Beneath the surface, however, AUKUS Pillar One’s industrial foundation is fragile. US shipyards suffer constraints that threaten Virginia-class delivery schedules and Australia is grappling with defence workforce shortages and inertia in US export controls. Continuous US fiscal pressures are forcing brutal trade-offs between funding surface fleet remediation and financing costly submarine acquisitions. While the US has eased some export controls on defence goods for approved Australian companies, checking that suppliers comply with the rules remains a friction point.
To ensure that deterrence works in the years before the submarines arrive, the alliance should execute six upgrades.
First, Australia should transition from importing munitions to making them. While US export controls and weakness of Australian capacity hinder rapid upscaling, the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise – Australia’s program for building missiles and munitions – should move past simple assembly as quickly as possible. Prioritising domestic production of solid rocket motors and hypersonic components will build up Australian stocks while building a vital second-line supply chain for the Indo-Pacific.
Second, Australia should harden vulnerable northern airbases, including Tindal and Darwin, while bolstering dual-use civilian infrastructure to absorb potential strikes. Doing so requires building attack-resistant facilities faster and empowering the US Oversight and Support Group – the administrative body coordinating the US military footprint in Australia – to store fuel, medical assets and ammunition across a decentralised, resilient grid.
Third, the alliance should strengthen conventional-nuclear integration as regional nuclear arsenals grow. Establishing a regular Australia–US dialogue to address how Washington extends strategic protection to Australia and to examine Canberra’s role in that effort would help. This dialogue, which should be modelled on the dialogues the US holds with Japan and South Korea, could run alongside Canberra’s and Washington’s existing senior defence policy talks or form part of them. It would help the two capitals keep a crisis from spiralling out of control, coordinate their nuclear and non-nuclear planning, and agree on how Australian forces would support US forces in the region.
Fourth, Canberra and Washington should anchor a broader coalition in Australia’s neighbourhood. Building on Anzac 2035 – Australia and New Zealand’s plan to make their militaries operate as a single combat force – bringing the New Zealand Defence Force into sub-surface maritime surveillance would revitalise trilateral cooperation and re-engage Wellington in practical, non-nuclear security burden-sharing. Simultaneously, expanding maritime capacity-building with willing Southeast Asian partners, beginning with the Philippines, would formalise an interconnected regional security grid.
Fifth, AUKUS partners should ensure that Pillar Two – covering technologies other than nuclear submarines – delivers near-term, practical capabilities quickly, avoiding broad tech lists that blur focus. Priority should remain on advanced undersea warfare, autonomous systems and AI. To prevent bureaucratic bloat or delayed execution, expanding participation to AUKUS outsiders should depend on their contributions to a particular project. Japan, for example, might join specific undersea work. New Zealand might help with integrating niche software. For now, strengthening cooperation among AUKUS partners should take priority over regional expansion. Later, the partners should consider anchoring these efforts in broader groupings, such as the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Four.
Finally, the alliance should cultivate its people over the long term. Establishing dedicated pipelines for defence, diplomatic and tech experts – through expanded bilateral fellowships, joint planning exchanges and multilateral postings – will sustain this evolving network.
Critics argue that deeper integration erodes Australian sovereignty. This is false. Strategic isolation and weakness invite coercion, whereas a capable regional network increases independence. Managing domestic hurdles – such as addressing public debate over nuclear stewardship – will nonetheless be vital to maintaining long-term political backing.
