Collins refurbishment looks like overrunning, hitting availability

Australia’s plan to extend the lives of its Collins-class submarines is quietly unravelling. While awaiting the arrival and build-up of a nuclear submarine fleet, the country is facing a high risk of downward-spiralling operational availability of its six diesel boats.
This risk is appearing despite a decision to avoid it by accepting a loss of the submarines’ future technological competitiveness.
In May 2026, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) delivered a sobering assessment of the Collins-class Life–of–Type Extension (LOTE) program, which is needed to keep the boats, already up to 30 years old, going into the 2030s and 2040s. The government had just revealed that LOTE would involve not modernisation but only refurbishment, and for only five of the submarines. This would keep the fleet in service with current capability.
The decision was based on an assessment from Collins-class builder and maintainer ASC and Defence’s own technical advisers: modernisations couldn’t be done quickly enough to maintain the pace of operations. Specifically, each boat’s upgrade would have needed more than the two years allowed for the overhaul that it would replace, called a full-cycle docking (FCD).
But the scaled-down LOTE probably can’t be done in two years, either. The submarines’ tight maintenance and overhaul routine, the Usage Upkeep Cycle, began drifting off schedule even before one of them, HMAS Farncomb, came out of the water in mid–2026 for the first LOTE effort. The boats are getting old, so unexpected problems are being found when workers look at them – and LOTE is more complex than FCD.
Collins-class sustainment has been on Defence’s Projects of Concern list since December 2024 and will remain there until at least October 2028.
Any slippage beyond the benchmark two-year FCD shatters the Usage Upkeep Cycle. In this routine, applied since 2016, submarines go into the Osborne North shipyard in Adelaide for back-to-back FCDs: one in, one out. And at any time there are two boats in the covered hall at Henderson, Perth, for lesser maintenance. This disciplined drumbeat keeps three boats in dock and three consistently available for operations. Crews’ posting cycles are predictable, and work for industry is steady.
Behind the cycle is the tyranny of each submarine’s 10-year safe-to-dive certification, whose clock begins ticking at the end of each FCD (or LOTE). Farncomb entered LOTE at Osborne North in the middle of this year because her previous FCD had been completed in mid-2016. But Rankin was and still is in the main hall at the shipyard for her FCD, which is overrunning its schedule. This is at least partly because its start was delayed by unexpected problems with the previous boat, Sheehan, which prolonged her FCD.
So Farncomb is being held on the external hardstand, restricting the work that can proceed until Rankin leaves. Getting Farncomb back to the fleet in June 2028 isn’t looking likely, even before the risk of unexpected difficulties in her work is considered. But June 2028 is when HMAS Collins needs to begin her LOTE, because her last FCD ended in June 2018.
Even if the Osborne North workforce were sized to handle two submarines in overlapping FCDs at once (and it’s not), having two boats out of the water there plus the usual two in lesser maintenance at Henderson leaves only two, not three, available for operations.
The operational consequence is fundamental and predictable: fewer available submarines mean fewer sea days, and fewer sea days mean fewer qualified sailors. Availability of only two submarines restricts training capacity and career development opportunities for junior officers. The service is then locked into a downward spiral in which training doesn’t keep up with departures of qualified people, submarine availability falls further, and with it, so does training output. This echoes the crewing crisis that prompted a 2008 review.
The spiral also threatens crewing for nuclear submarines, because many of their sailors will need to be drawn from the Collins fleet.
This industrial and crewing squeeze will intensify as competing naval programs collide at Osborne. ASC employs more than 2,700 people across South Australia and Western Australia to sustain the Collins fleet. Next door at Osborne South, BAE Systems already has more than 2,500 workers building the first Hunter-class frigate, and construction there is ramping up. Both yards are fishing in the same shallow South Australian pool of security-cleared welders, pipefitters, electricians and engineers, fuelling wage inflation and industrial disputes over pay parity.
At the same time, ASC is already steering new hires and experienced engineers and supervisors into nuclear submarine sustainment in Western Australia and into a joint venture with BAE Systems to build submarines of the SSN-AUKUS class at Osborne by the end of the decade.
The workforce squeeze is locked in unless AUKUS Pillar One is set aside or fundamentally recast. SSN-AUKUS will eventually need another 4,000 to 5,500 direct shipyard workers.
For Adelaide, the combination of ASC’s talent diversion, the LOTE dockings, the Hunter-class frigate build and looming SSN-AUKUS construction is industrially unrealistic. It threatens to keep Collins-class submarines out of the water even longer, worsening the availability and crewing problem.
Four years ago in The Strategist, I warned that Australia’s transition to nuclear-powered submarines left no margin for error. Quite apart from worries about delivery of the new submarines themselves, error is emerging in the Collins maintenance and overhaul program. And it’s presenting a severe risk of a widening submarine capability gap at precisely the wrong time strategically.
