How a Trump–Kim summit should address the nuclear issue

The central policy question in dealing with North Korea’s nuclear program is shifting – away from the seemingly impossible goal of denuclearisation and towards managing the nuclear threat from Pyongyang.
If President Donald Trump achieves the meeting with Kim Jong-un that he’s looking for, possibly this month, threat management should be the theme of the discussion.
Before discussing any easing of sanctions, the United States should seek transparency on the status of North Korea’s arsenal, followed by risk reduction measures. Following that, it should ask for external verification of the stability of nuclear weapons sites, then a promise that Pyongyang will not conduct further tests.
Trump has expressed an interest in a meeting with Kim, possibly around the time of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in China on 19 November, although it’s unclear whether it will happen.
The US president is again focused on his ‘friend’ Kim, having neither managed to verifiably denuclearise Iran nor signalled any post-New START arms limitation discussions with Russia. Politically constrained by an incoming Democratic-controlled Congress, Trump has few options and an extremely narrow window for achieving his long-held aim to rid the world of nuclear weapons.
The US and South Korea seem to be shifting their long-standing policies on the North Korean nuclear issue. Both Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung have recently commented on North Korea’s substantial numbers of nukes and spoke of ‘freezing’, not dismantling, its nuclear weapons program.
China’s standing policy – which aligns with the US and South Korea on the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula – has also been watered down, at least in publicly available documents. Russia, for its part, is actively aiding and abetting Kim’s nuclear weapons program.
Trump seems open to a major change in the US–North Korea relationship, but a stalemate persists without an agreement on denuclearisation in exchange for sanctions relief, as was raised in the aborted Trump-Kim 2019 Hanoi summit. Kim may not respond to Trump’s latest overture without a signal that Washington will formally acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear-armed state.
In this era of dramatically shifting strategic sands, Trump would be wise to listen to experts on how to convince Kim to relinquish his nuclear arsenal, or at least hold discussions before accidents or strategic escalation occur.
Regardless of whether Trump and Kim meet or the US tacitly recognises North Korea’s nuclear weapons status, managing Pyongyang’s nuclear threats is becoming the main issue.
Under these conditions, how should US officials set up a meeting agenda that reaps results?
At the very least, they should persuade Trump to signal that any change in sanctions would not be on the table until Kim provided a set of assurances and offered to verify them.
Nuclear transparency would be top of the list. As a first step, North Korea should be required to confirm the status of its arsenal. It must agree to transparency measures, including site visits by a US expert or a trusted foreign intermediary – even if it’s not the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at this point.
If Kim responded to these demands for greater transparency, discussion could move to risk reduction, hotlines or other confidence-building measures to avoid miscalculations on either side. The US–South Korea joint command would ideally participate.
After this, Trump could seek Kim’s assurance that his nuclear weapons sites are stable and secure, eventually raising the possibility of verification by the IAEA.
And finally, given that the US has not conducted a nuclear test for more than 30 years, Washington could seek a promise from Pyongyang, which last tested in 2017, that it too will not test.
Any one of these proposals would normally entail years of official negotiations. None is likely to be realised on the back of a hasty Trump–Kim trophy photo.
But a summit without real outcomes could undermine any chance of future progress. The US must avoid a repeat of the three 2018–19 Trump–Kim summits that were all about photo calls and produced no outcomes. The only beneficiary was North Korea, which gained recognition as a legitimate state by the world’s preeminent power.
This time around, the US must be aware that global efforts to control nuclear weapons and stop the vicious cycle of proliferation – and catastrophic escalation – would be dealt a serious blow if Trump unwittingly moved another step in legitimising Kim’s criminal, unaccountable regime.
