Between democracies and autocracies, a conflict brews regarding the destiny of the internet within an obscure UN procedure.
Currently, the United Nations is in the process of a 20-year reassessment of its World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), a seminal string of conferences that officially instituted the present multi-stakeholder model of internet administration. This framework guarantees that the internet remains unrestricted, worldwide, and not governed by a single authority.
This framework is now the focus of an intense global power struggle. Authoritarian nations are advocating for a multi-party governance strategy—a move that would transfer authority over the internet entirely to governments. This transition could endorse crackdowns on opposition, expand online monitoring, empower internet closures, dilute human rights, and hasten the global expansion of digital authoritarianism.
Regrettably, the WSIS+20 review is underway as this method of internet and digital administration is gaining popularity. In recent times, China and Russia have made noteworthy advancements within the UN to promote their agendas for greater state authority over the internet and digital governance. In 2024, the UN Cybercrime Treaty granted governments new powers over online operations, raising fears it could streamline digital surveillance and legalize limitations on human rights and freedoms, while the UN Global Digital Compact also tilted toward a more prominent state involvement in digital governance matters.
These instances establish a worrisome pattern as WSIS+20 progresses, raising queries about whether the internet will remain unrestrained and accessible, or whether the UN will endorse digital authoritarianism on a global scale.
What exactly is WSIS?
WSIS, held across two phases in 2003 and 2005, was a significant UN summit that united the international community to ‘encourage a people-centric, inclusive, and development-oriented Information Society.’ It cemented 11 action lines to leverage information communication technologies for worldwide advancement and entrusted various UN bodies with supervising their execution.
In 2005, WSIS’s Tunis Agenda formally solidified the multi-stakeholder model of internet governance that had evolved since the internet’s inception, stressing the integration of governments, civil society, technical experts, academia, and the private sector. This acknowledged that the internet is a labyrinthine network with several stakeholders facilitating its operations. This system—by principle—also barred any individual entity, particularly states, from exercising excessive command or influence over the internet’s structure. Among WSIS’s accomplishments was the establishment of the UN’s Internet Governance Forum (IGF), a platform where governments, civil society, the private sector, technical experts, and academia could interact and cooperate on internet governance matters.
Twenty years later, the WSIS+20 review of 2025 will revisit established principles and evaluate advancements regarding the WSIS action lines. The review will ponder extending WSIS’s mandate, the future of the IGF (whose mandate also concludes in 2025), and potentially broadening WSIS’s remit to encompass nascent technologies such as AI.
The review procedure comprises various facets. UN bodies are appraising their respective WSIS action lines. The UN Commission on Science and Technology for Development is coordinating inputs from stakeholders and compiling a report set to release in April. This report will guide discussions at the UN General Assembly, culminating in a resolution presented for UN adoption in December. Throughout the year, events like June’s IGF in Norway (the final one before the forum’s mandate expires) and July’s WSIS+20 High-Level Event in Geneva will offer critical opportunities for the multi-stakeholder community to contribute to the review process before governmental negotiations intensify.
WSIS and global power dynamics
Given the escalating role of digital technologies in contemporary society, the WSIS+20 review is a chance to shape the future of the internet and guarantee its continued openness, inclusivity, and development focus. The objectives and ideals of WSIS have never been more crucial. Nonetheless, WSIS has evolved into a convoluted geopolitical arena due to its central position in the multi-stakeholder model of internet governance.
For an extended period, nations like China and Russia have advocated for a multilateral outlook, positing that internet and wider digital governance should be under state control rather than governed through the multi-stakeholder model.
Moderate critique of the multi-stakeholder system is justifiable. While the model has fostered an open and inventive internet for years, it has been dominated by Western governments and major conglomerates, leaving several countries—particularly in the Global South—feeling marginalized in discussions. Its disjointed and intricate processes can be challenging and costly to navigate, curtailing meaningful involvement. As challenges in digital arenas like AI governance become increasingly pressing, numerous countries also recognize the necessity for enhanced state involvement to safeguard national autonomy and counterbalance the unrestricted authority of Big Tech. Even democratic nations, traditionally fervent supporters of the multi-stakeholder model, are progressively leaning towards multilateral methods to regulate tech giants and handle digital challenges more effectively.
China and Russia have adroitly and methodically exploited these criticisms to advance their own objectives, positioning multilateralism as a more comprehensive and equitable alternative to the multi-stakeholder model.
Nevertheless, their push for multilateral governance explicitly serves to solidify authoritarian dominion over the internet. Both countries advocate for ‘cyber sovereignty’ or ‘internet sovereignty,’ doctrines advocating absolute state control over domestic internet governance that effectively rationalize their digital authoritarian tactics.
Despite the façade of advocating increased multilateral collaboration, their intention is to consolidate power in forums where only nation-states possess voting rights, essentially marginalizing civil society and other stakeholders. This poses grave ramifications for global human rights and freedoms.
Over the prior year, authoritarian states have made remarkable progress in promoting this multilateral vision within the UN framework through initiatives like the Global Digital Compact and the …
Agreement to combat cybercrime. WSIS+20 gives them a chance to solidify these achievements and fundamentally alter global digital management to suit their needs.
Desires of authoritarian regimes
The approach of authoritarian governments towards WSIS will probably be concentrated on four main strategic areas.
Initially, they may advocate for fresh initiatives or language that fortifies multinational collaboration and action, aiming to centralize power in platforms where only nation-states hold voting rights, potentially sidelining other participants. Their efforts may aim to delineate WSIS as the enacting body of the Global Digital Compact (GDC)—a framework negotiated by nation-states—or attempt to subordinate WSIS under this framework, despite WSIS’s independent mission. This might also involve efforts to reinforce the recently established UN Office of Emerging and Digital Technologies, an output of the GDC. The creation of this office has stirred controversy due to the lack of clarity regarding its mission and its potential to not only further centralize internet management within the UN in New York but also to centralize it within the UN secretariat.
Secondly, they might focus on the IGF. While halting its extension seems improbable, authoritarian nations could work to transfer its functions to other UN entities where only states possess voting authority—an idea that China has supported for a long time. Alternatively, they may attempt to reduce the effectiveness of the IGF by continuing with voluntary funding or establishing new competing multinational mechanisms that duplicate its functions.
Thirdly, they may advocate for broadening WSIS’s mandate to encompass emerging technologies, particularly through programs that underscore multinational participation. This could create opportunities to influence the management of AI, data, biotechnology, and other emerging domains across several separate platforms, complicating the tracking of advancements and coordination of responses.
Fourthly, authoritarian nations, particularly China, are expected to take advantage of WSIS+20’s focus on development. China has pushed for the right to development as a justification for prioritizing state-led economic advancement over other fundamental human rights and freedoms, utilizing it as a strategic tool to boost the domestic authoritarian system in the name of economic growth. WSIS+20’s emphasis on development, and the immediate need to bridge the global digital divide, raises the risk of this concept spreading to global digital management. This could lay the foundation for other states to embrace digital authoritarian practices under the pretext of national development priorities.
The significant influence wielded by China within the Global South in the evaluation process heightens these concerns. China has substantial clout through this group, including through the G77+China coalition, which speaks for 134 of the 193 UN member states—a majority of UN votes if they negotiate or vote collectively, as seen in the recent GDC negotiations.
The structural components of the WSIS+20 evaluation further lean the process towards authoritarian interests. The end document will be proposed for adoption by the UN General Assembly’s Second Committee. Beijing has traditionally held a strong position in this forum, escalating the risk of WSIS+20 leaning towards a state-centric model at the expense of the multistakeholder approach.
WSIS does not unfold in isolation
While the WSIS+20 evaluation may appear as a distant UN procedure, it is unfolding amidst a swiftly evolving internet and digital arena.
The internet is progressively becoming more closed and less global as national governments— including democracies—assert greater dominance over digital platforms. Global internet freedom is declining, with China and Russia advancing their state-focused visions for digital management not just within the UN but also through influential organizations like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Simultaneously, China is disseminating its digital authoritarian blueprint across the globe via the Digital Silk Road, laying down regulations and technologies that reinforce state control.
This transformation is not only at a normative or policy level. Geopolitical competition is seeping into technical standards. The bedrocks of the global internet are beginning to splinter. For instance, China’s proposed IPv6+ strategy introduces protocols that enable increased state control over internet traffic, raising apprehensions about its potential global adoption as Chinese technology spreads.
The physical framework of the internet is also fragmenting. Subsea cables, telecommunication networks, and satellite systems are becoming fragmented along geopolitical lines. Efforts to sever technology supply chains— such as critical minerals, semiconductors, and advanced chips— are further deepening these divisions.
Final Thoughts
WSIS+20 is not merely a customary review. It stands as a pivotal point for the future of the internet.
For democratic nations, WSIS represents the ultimate chance to safeguard the multistakeholder model of internet governance. Democracies must lead efforts to enhance this model, ensuring it becomes more inclusive and responsive to the necessities and preferences of the Global South, with a clear vision on leveraging digital technologies for development. WSIS provides an opportunity for genuine collaboration with these nations to refine the system and tackle developmental obstacles, while combatting the narratives espoused by authoritarian regimes.
Multistakeholder entities, like ICANN, along with the technical community and civil society, united ahead of the GDC negotiations last year to resist attempts at eroding the open and global internet and shaping discussions on the evolution of the multistakeholder model. They are similarly approaching WSIS with the seriousness it merits. Democracies must respond in kind.
If democracies fail to approach WSIS with the seriousness it warrants, 2025 might signify the close of the open global internet era. The struggle for the internet transcends digital governance—it symbolizes the forefront of the broader conflict over the global order.
Authoritarian states recognize this. It is time for democracies to do the same.
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