Upon the arrival of the US Navy’s Great White Fleet in Sydney Harbour in 1908, it marked a clear statement of imperial strength, showcasing America’s newfound naval power. Over a century later, the Chinese navy has been conducting its own version of naval diplomacy by encircling Australia – albeit without a warm reception. The parallels and contrasts between these incidents shed light on the contemporary age of empires in which Australia is now situated.
Both demonstrations were exhibitions of might. The former embodied President Teddy Roosevelt’s diplomatic approach of speaking softly while wielding a formidable force – the inaugural rendition of peace through power – whereas the latter was designed to disrupt harmony.
The visit of the Great White Fleet was a spectacle. Aussies cheered as 16 glistening battleships, gleaming in white hues and shiny embellishments, paraded into Sydney Harbour. A set of stairs, known as the Fleet Steps, was constructed in the Royal Botanic Gardens to welcome the American guests.
The visit was a calculated diplomatic maneuver orchestrated by Prime Minister Alfred Deakin through extending the invitation and by US President Teddy Roosevelt through accepting it. Both Australia, a young federation deeply linked to the British Empire, and the United States, an emerging yet not fully established superpower, viewed the introduction of US Pacific presence to Japan as beneficial.
For Roosevelt, the fleet also showcased his assertive foreign policy to European nations: the US had established itself as a global force. Equally significant was his view of the fleet’s global tour as a tool to elucidate to the American populace the necessity of investing in defense, including naval assets, as the nation ventured into international prospects alongside potential threats. The fortification of deterrence, readiness, and societal approval bolstered national resilience.
Deakin recognized the opportunity and not only welcomed the fleet to Australia but actively engineered the visit. He aimed to instill in Australia the notion that it should possess its naval fleet. The irregular deployments of the Royal Navy to the Far East could not ensure Australian security.
Similar to Roosevelt, Deakin comprehended that a passive defense approach would not ensure the nation’s safety in an epoch characterized by ascending military powers, necessitating an immediate shift to proactive engagement, not solely after a crisis had commenced. He harbored particular concerns about Japan’s expanding naval capabilities, yet akin to Roosevelt, he also monitored Russian and subsequently German naval strength.
While Deakin advocated for a national navy and espoused imperial ideals, he deemed it wise to initiate a partnership with the US. Despite not yet replacing Britain as the global leader, the US had emerged onto the strategic stage merely a decade earlier. It had annexed the Philippines during the Spanish-American War in 1898, and in that same year, it acquired the Hawaiian Islands, establishing the US as a Pacific force.
Both men in the early 1900s grasped the correlation between European and Pacific security and endeavored to safeguard their national interests by collaborating against European and Asian powers intent on fostering instability and securing spheres of influence.
As vividly portrayed by Russell Parkins in Great White Fleet to Coral Sea, Deakin articulated in one of his written invitations to the US that ‘No other Federation in the world possesses so many features of resemblance to that of the United States as does the Commonwealth of Australia’. Roosevelt later acknowledged that he had not initially planned for the fleet to visit Australia, but Deakin’s invitation affirmed his ‘wholehearted admiration for, and camaraderie with, Australia, and I believe that America should be prepared to support Australia in any grave emergency’.
This epitomized naval strength with a gentle touch: immense firepower adrift on the harbor, coupled with amicable conversations over tea ashore.
In present times, the strategic landscape once again involves European and Asian powers – Russia and China – vying for spheres of influence, but the dynamics of the naval encounter could not be more disparate. There is no time for social calls over tea; instead, there exists the stark reality that Australia confronts a security threat from Beijing necessitating national readiness and international camaraderie and coalitions.
When Australia crosses paths with China at sea, the interactions are adversarial, marked by risky Chinese maneuvers, powerful lasers directed into cockpits, chaff deployed into Australian aircraft engines, and sonar inflicting harm on Australian navy divers. These encounters are not amiable port visits but rather perilous military activities and exhibitions of coercive statecraft.
While the Great White Fleet sought goodwill and partnerships, China’s naval actions embody a display of supremacy. If there were any doubts among the Australian public regarding Beijing’s intentions toward the region, China’s conduct in this recent series of events should serve as a lesson. The absence of forewarning to Australia itself acted as a forewarning of looming actions. Beijing desires for us to take heed and acquiesce.
We must resist submission. We must glean insights from the incident and alter Beijing’s conduct.
During the previous visit of a Chinese naval flotilla to Sydney in 2019, there was an air of public unease, if not alarm. After all, Australia had endorsed the visit. However, a mixture of Canberra’s historical unawareness and Beijing’s inclination to reshape history led to the approval without recognizing that it coincided with the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square tragedy.
Shortly after the arranged port call, China suspended ministerial-level dialogues as part of a coercion campaign to align Australia with its wishes. Despite some recent improvements in relations, Beijing opted not to provide Australia with a heads-up about live-fire drills. The same Beijing that had earlier notified of a visit now demonstrates the confidence to act without warning.
Australia must cease being caught off guard by each new development in Chinese military or hybrid warfare strategies. Beijing’s assurance is mounting in all domains, including cyberspace. Through intrusions labeled as Volt Typhoon, China’s intelligence agencies were exposed in 2023 for having pre-placed malware aimed at disrupting and damaging our vital infrastructure. This should also be interpreted as a rehearsal for upcoming cyber operations.
For the first time in the contemporary era, we have observed a potential adversary rehearse its wartime kinetic strategy against Australia. While the Japanese conducted surveillance and gathered intelligence before World War II, this circumnavigation accompanied by live-fire exercises transcends mere data gathering. Beijing has been engaged in ‘intelligence preparation of the battlespace’ for some time with the frequent dispatch of vessels to Australian waters for monitoring our exercises or conducting oceanographic surveys.
Enhance submarine operations).
The Chinese flotilla serves as a prompt for us to acknowledge the necessity of expanding our fleet to ensure our security, similar to how the Great White Fleet influenced the development of the Australian navy. This historical parallel should stimulate our contemplation and prompt decisive actions to bolster Australian sovereign capabilities in response to distant fleets operating in Australian waters.
These instances highlight a consistent reality of Australia’s geopolitical positioning: as a regional power sandwiched between dominant global naval forces. One could argue that we are encompassed by maritime supremacy. This has been a longstanding characteristic of our geography and historical circumstances.
Australia has consistently navigated shifts in power dynamics, transitioning from British to American dominance in the Pacific and currently adapting to China’s challenge to the US-led order. Flexibility and nuanced management of strategic relationships have always been imperative.
However, the contrast lies in Australia’s warm reception of the Great White Fleet in 1908 compared to the unwelcome presence of ships demonstrating disinterest in cordial port visits today. This necessitates a measured yet assertive response, avoiding recklessness to steer clear of appearing indecisive.
Amidst challenging circumstances, the Australian government should not feel constrained to walk a tightrope while dealing with China. The response to Beijing’s provocations should be calibrated to deter further aggression, rather than aiming for an extreme response that would leave trade and diplomacy unaffected. European nations have erred in managing Russia by avoiding accountability, hoping that engaging with Putin would continue without facing military repercussions.
It is futile to ignore or hope that isolated incidents of unfriendly behavior are inconsequential. China’s aggressive actions are indicative of its global stance, which is unlikely to change. Diplomatic silence will not dissuade Beijing but instead embolden its hostile conduct. Australia must demonstrate its capability to respond decisively before Beijing’s actions escalate conflict unintentionally or deliberately until confrontation becomes inevitable. Australia cannot afford to delay asserting itself until a potential conflict materializes.
Quoting Teddy Roosevelt, a proactive foreign policy entails “the exercise of intelligent forethought and of decisive action sufficiently far in advance of any likely crisis.” Confronting aggression mandates a clear understanding of the stakes involved.
Australia’s engagement in the South China Sea aligns with international law, supporting regional stability alongside allied nations. This contrasts with China’s recent ventures into the Tasman Sea, reflecting another instance of audacious behavior following its hazardous encounters with Australian forces. Through various acts of provocation like laser incidents, chaff, or sonar harassment, China exhibits a consistent pattern of intimidation attempts. While Australia upholds the rules-based order and stability during its maritime endeavors, China’s motives often aim to subvert regulations and sow regional instability.
The intimidation tactics transcend Australia and are relevant regionally. Analogous to how the Great White Fleet affirmed America’s Pacific influence, China’s naval maneuvers signify Beijing’s intentions to reconfigure the region’s strategic equilibrium. Australia must evolve, much like it has in the past, by bolstering its defensive capabilities, fostering alliances with democratic partners, and maintaining adept diplomacy crucial for its endurance amidst the fluctuating global powers.
Crucially, the government must engage the Australian populace in this journey. The looming threat posed by China should not surprise Australians, akin to how Putin’s threats should not astonish Europeans.
Education empowers individuals, allowing them to remain vigilant and unwavering in the face of China’s hostilities. Australians should trust in the government’s ability to handle the situation adeptly, as defense investments serve as a proactive measure for our future security. Assurances should be given that such investments reduce the likelihood of conflicts.
While Australia may not be a dominant force, possessing the 13th-largest global economy endows us with influence. Shedding the perception of a moderate power, Australia should exude confidence as a regional power, aware that its actions hold weight domestically and internationally. This explains why Washington seeks active partnerships while Beijing prefers subdued interactions. Australia’s steadfast advocacy for a rules-based global system and its vocal stance against Beijing’s transgressions resonate in Europe, Asia, and North America.
Smaller regional nations rely on Australia to confront Beijing in scenarios where they feel powerless, akin to Europe recognizing the fight against Russia extends to its unrestricted ally, China. Australia’s defense of its interests and allies will reinforce the value of partnerships, particularly with the US.
Reflecting on Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet, its demonstration of strength aimed to deter conflicts and prepare for contingencies should deterrence fail. The current landscape necessitates a renewed focus on deterrence and preparedness. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson recently declared China’s readiness for various forms of war, illustrating the imperative for preparedness alongside key allies like the US.
Alongside our allies, we must showcase our resolve to avert conflict while remaining prepared for eventualities. Without demonstrating a credible defense capability and a willingness to employ it when necessary, defeat is imminent whether or not a physical confrontation transpires.
In the words of Teddy Roosevelt, “Peace is a great good; and doubly harmful, therefore, is the attitude of those who advocate it in terms that would make it synonymous with selfish and cowardly shrinking from warring against the existence of evil.”
The past underscores the importance of strategic foresight and adaptability in navigating competitive landscapes. The echoes of 1908 offer valuable lessons and cautionary markers for the uncertain terrain that lies ahead.
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