Critical macOS Flaw Lets Attackers Bypass Apple Privacy Controls Without Consent
A newly disclosed macOS vulnerability allows attackers to silently access sensitive user data, bypassing Apple’s privacy controls without user consent.
The flaw allows attackers to bypass macOS Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) protections entirely.
An attacker “… can execute arbitrary AppleScript files and send AppleEvents to any target process (such as Finder), thereby completely bypassing the TCC protection mechanism,” security researcher Mickey Jin said in a Dec. 31 blog post.
Inside the macOS TCC bypass vulnerability
Tracked as CVE-2025-43530, the vulnerability affects macOS systems that rely on Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) to restrict application access to sensitive resources such as the microphone, camera, and user documents.
TCC is designed to act as a central enforcement mechanism for user privacy decisions, requiring explicit consent before protected resources can be accessed.
The issue stems from how macOS historically trusted certain Apple-signed system services — specifically the VoiceOver screen reader — an accessibility feature intended for visually impaired users.
VoiceOver operates with elevated privileges and communicates through the ScreenReader.framework and the com.apple.scrod service, both of which were granted broad system access as trusted components.
Researchers identified two distinct weaknesses that allow this trust to be abused.
First, macOS relied on file-based validation, trusting any Apple-signed binary without verifying whether it had been modified. This allowed attackers to inject malicious dynamic libraries into trusted system processes, enabling code execution without administrative privileges.
Second, a Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) flaw allowed attackers to bypass security validation by modifying a process after it had passed initial checks but before execution. By exploiting this timing gap, attackers could execute unauthorized actions under the context of a trusted system service.
When combined, these flaws allow attackers to fully bypass TCC enforcement. Successful exploitation enables the execution of arbitrary AppleScript commands and the sending of AppleEvents to other applications, including Finder.
As a result, attackers can silently access sensitive files, interact with user data, and capture microphone input without triggering user prompts, alerts, or permission dialogs. The vulnerability can be exploited locally without administrative privileges, increasing risk in enterprise environments with shared devices or where initial access is easily obtained.
Although there are no reports of exploitation in the wild yet, proof-of-concept exploit code is available at the time of publication.
Reducing macOS endpoint attack surface
While applying Apple’s patch is the most important step, effective mitigation requires a layered approach that combines configuration hardening, access controls, and continuous monitoring.
- Patch all macOS endpoints immediately by upgrading to macOS 26.2 or later.
- Restrict and regularly audit accessibility and automation permissions, including VoiceOver and AppleEvents, to ensure only approved applications have access.
- Enforce least-privilege controls on endpoints by limiting admin rights, restricting developer tools, and preventing execution from user-writable locations.
- Monitor for suspicious automation behavior such as unexpected AppleScript execution, Finder manipulation, or abnormal AppleEvent activity using EDR and SIEM tools.
- Harden macOS security settings by keeping Gatekeeper and System Integrity Protection enabled and blocking unsigned or modified dynamic library loading where possible.
- Centralize macOS logging and perform proactive threat hunting to detect anomalous entitlement use, dylib injection attempts, or other indicators of local exploitation.
- Regularly test and update incident response plans to ensure teams can quickly identify, contain, and remediate macOS endpoint compromises.
This vulnerability underscores a broader industry challenge: security models that place implicit trust in privileged system components can inadvertently create high-impact attack vectors when validation and enforcement mechanisms break down.
It also serves as a clear reminder that privacy controls, no matter how well-designed, are only effective when consistently enforced.
Editor’s note: This article first appeared on our sister publication, eSecurityPlanet.com.
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