The intention behind deploying a Chinese naval task group in our vicinity is evidently to convey a message and evaluate Australia’s reactions—not solely from a military perspective, but also socially and politically. The worst mistake would be to overreact and gift China a public relations triumph that could weaken Australia’s lawful military operations in the South China Sea and North-East Asia.
For a long time, Australia has thrived on the liberty and prosperity we’ve relished since World War II. The geographical distance from the potential hotspots in Europe and the Middle East made conflicts seem distant. We’ve been ingrained with the belief that while our citizens may participate in faraway conflicts, the danger never reaches our homeland.
Yet, the positioning of a Chinese naval task group off Australia’s eastern coast has laid bare our weaknesses as a maritime nation that is heavily dependent on trade. While this reality is keenly felt, our appropriate approach should involve investing in the necessary ships, aircraft, and submarines to safeguard our maritime interests—rather than fabricating a critical situation that undermines our societal capacity and political capability to respond effectively to genuine challenges.
Australia resides away from major trade routes or transit points. Naval task groups seldom operate in our region—unless they are paying a visit to Australia—thus the presence of a Chinese task group is particularly noteworthy. This three-ship task group from China, positioned over 8000 kilometers away from its coast—including one of the most advanced warships globally—was clearly intended to convey a specific message.
According to international law, China’s warships are entitled to operate on the open seas (beyond 200 nautical miles from our shores). They are also permitted to conduct maneuvers within Australia’s exclusive economic zone (which extends up to 200 nautical miles from our coast). Additionally, they can even operate within our territorial sea (within 12 nautical miles of our coast) as long as their transit is uninterrupted, swift, and doesn’t disrupt Australia’s established order. This isn’t a matter of legal technicalities—it represents a key element of the freedom of the seas exercised routinely by Australia through our naval missions.
Although it might come as a surprise to witness naval task groups engage in live-fire exercises in our vicinity, warships—including those from Australia—frequently do so during extended voyages for training purposes, skill maintenance, or various other reasons. This is simply a routine aspect of warship activities.
The gunnery exercise conducted by China took place on the high seas, approximately 640 kilometers (340 nautical miles) away from our shores—equivalent to the distance between Canberra and Melbourne. China is well within its rights to carry out such drills without notifying Australia or New Zealand.
While no international law mandates it, the best practice, after having conducted numerous gunnery firings at sea, is for warships to keep a minimum distance of at least 18 kilometers (10 nautical miles) from known civilian air routes during live-fire exercises. Air Services Australia reported that 49 aircraft had to be redirected due to the firing exercise conducted by the Chinese warships. Clearly, these warships were positioned in close proximity to these flight paths.
Although this redirecting of flights might have caused inconvenience, aircraft are frequently rerouted for various reasons, and there is no evidence to suggest that they were in any danger. The radar systems on the Chinese warships would have continuously tracked these aircraft, ensuring that they ceased the gunnery exercise if the aircraft approached their safety perimeter—similar to the standard protocol followed by any responsible warship.
Warships should also issue warnings to civilian aircraft and vessels well in advance of several hours—and periodically—during such exercises. It remains unclear how early the Chinese warships issued this warning, but as per the Senate estimates, it was first heard by a Virgin Airlines plane 30 minutes after the commencement of the drills by the warships.
The close proximity of the Chinese warships to civilian air routes—and their apparent delay in issuing timely warnings—merits diplomatic criticism. However, their presence and the live-fire exercise on the high seas do not.
The freedom of the seas serves as a cornerstone for the security of our nation as a maritime trading entity. Assertions that China’s warships should not operate within our exclusive economic zone or conduct live-fire drills on the open seas challenge this fundamental principle, thereby offering China a propaganda advantage to contest our vital deployments to North-East Asia and the South China Sea—through which two-thirds of our maritime trade flows.
This situation does not constitute a crisis. Treating it as such with exaggerated outrage diminishes our capacity to address actual crises as the regional circumstances worsen. Furthermore, given that this deployment was intended as a test for us, it communicates to China that we lack societal resilience and a realistic understanding of what poses a genuine threat.
If the deployment of the Chinese naval task group is intended to indicate that they can function within our locale, maintain a presence, and jeopardize our critical maritime supply routes, how should we counter the vulnerabilities that have surfaced in the past two weeks? We must respond by heeding to the message—negating our vulnerabilities and enhancing our maritime capabilities. At this crucial strategic juncture post-WWII, our current fleet of surface combatants is the smallest and oldest it has been since 1950.
Our warships have limited endurance at sea due to insufficient numbers of replenishment vessels, and our capacity to safeguard sea lanes from mines is also restricted—to highlight just a few of our obstacles. We must address these issues promptly, which entails a thorough examination of our defense expenditure.
With defense spending currently at 2 percent of GDP, it falls short of our Cold War average of 2.7 percent. It is high time to bolster our industrial capabilities and engage in substantial discussions relating to societal and industrial mobilization. This means, in the event of a conflict, how would we mobilize the civilian population to support our defense forces and homeland security, and how would we mobilize industries to manufacture what is necessary to sustain the conflict?
We must respond by enhancing our readiness and military capabilities, not by granting China a propaganda triumph that undermines our ability to tackle real crises and the fundamental principle of freedom of the seas.
Even though conflict in our region is not inevitable, the threat exists and necessitates a restrained response grounded on preparedness, investment, and partnerships. Warships enjoy the freedom of navigation as a right. Live gunnery drills are customary. Overreaction and hysteria will only undermine our endeavors.
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