Following the release of the recent intelligence assessment carried out by Heather Smith and Richard Maude, skeptics may ponder: what’s with all the commotion? Despite the extensive list of suggestions, the overall evaluation proposes only gradual modifications. To grasp the situation better, it’s beneficial to ponder the historical backdrop. This piece offers a recap of previous intelligence appraisals that preceded the current one and their relevance in today’s context.
There are two key points to highlight upfront. Firstly, there has been a slow and irregular shift for intelligence entities from functioning under largely secretive directives of past centuries to now operating under formalized and accessible legislation that can be scrutinized by professionals, commentators, and naysayers alike.
Secondly, the proliferation of intelligence bodies and the growth in oversight mechanisms over time have been significant. These oversight processes encompass various parliamentary, executive, and independent accountability mechanisms, as depicted in the diagram of the NIC Structure and Responsibility Framework (collated by the author) below. The outcome is a collection of governmental bodies designed to deliver precise, trustworthy, and timely intelligence assistance to policymakers, matched with parliamentary, executive, and impartial oversight mechanisms that are unparalleled globally. But let’s first delve into the journey that led us here.
Legacy from World War II
The intelligence agencies that emerged after World War II varied from their wartime forerunners. Initially, collaborative agencies were formed in 1942 while working with the United States under General Douglas MacArthur, where Americans and Australians collaborated closely. Notable entities included the Central Bureau (for signal intelligence) and the Allied Intelligence Bureau (for espionage, human intelligence, sabotage, and special operations), along with the Allied Translator and Interpreter Services and Allied Geographical Section. However, when the Americans departed at the war’s conclusion, they took with them a substantial portion of the organizational structure, personnel, and equipment supporting these agencies.
Source: author.
Early Setup during the Cold War
The Australian remnants of the joint US-Australian entities were consolidated at Victoria Barracks in Melbourne until a post-war strategy was devised. By 1947, a national signals-intelligence body, the Defence Signals Bureau, had been established; this laid the groundwork for the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD). Simultaneously, the Joint Intelligence Bureau, a precursor to today’s Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), was also formed. In 1949, the wartime domestic security service was viewed as unreliable and compromised, leading to its replacement under a prime ministerial directive with the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). Alfred Brookes embarked on establishing a foreign human intelligence agency in 1952, known as the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS). These agencies operated discretely without garnering significant media attention.
The Petrov Incident and Subsequent Inquiry
The highly publicized defection in 1954 of KGB officer Vladimir Petrov and his wife, Evdokia, who served as the embassy’s cipher clerk, marked a major triumph for ASIO and thrust the organization into the limelight. The subsequent Royal Commission on Espionage focused on espionage activities but did not delve deeply into ASIO or other intelligence bodies. The inquiry was marred by controversy, with the Labor Party questioning its legitimacy as a tactic orchestrated by Prime Minister Robert Menzies ahead of a federal election. In The Spy Catchers by David Horner, the true narrative emerges. While Menzies seized the opportunity, the defection was genuine. ASIO was eventually placed under legislative oversight. Legal action was not pursued, as a significant portion of the corroborative evidence on the alleged network of spies stemmed from a highly sensitive source – decrypted Soviet diplomatic messages indicating Australian involvement in sharing intelligence with the Soviets. Subsequently, the ASIO Act of 1956 was enacted, marking the first instance where an Australian intelligence agency was subjected to statutory regulations, although parliamentary accountability for ASIO would take time to materialize.
The Initial Hope Commission Investigation
It would be two decades before another royal commission delved into the workings of Australia’s intelligence infrastructure. In 1974, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam enlisted Robert Marsden Hope, a judge from New South Wales known for his civil liberties advocacy, to spearhead the Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security (RCIS). Hope scrutinized the post-war intelligence setup and recommended a series of changes, many of which were implemented during Malcolm Fraser’s tenure. This involved the establishment of the Office of National Assessments (ONA) in 1977, along with the push for a revised and expanded ASIO Act in 1979. Additionally, a Security Appeals Tribunal was instituted, later merging into the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), which was recently rebranded as the Administrative Review Tribunal.
Security Enhancements Evaluation
Shortly after concluding the RCIS, Hope was assigned to conductIn February 1978, a Security Review (PSR) was conducted. The Hilton Hotel in downtown Sydney was bombed, coinciding with the Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional meeting led by Fraser. Intelligence and policing coordination at state and federal levels were improved based on the review recommendations to combat terrorism.
Another Phase with Hope
In February 1983, Bob Hawke, the new prime minister, tasked Hope with reviewing the progress made by the intelligence community (AIC) since Whitlam’s commission a decade prior. The expulsion of KGB officer Valery Ivanov during RCASIA. The review expanded to address an ASIS exercise debacle at the Sheraton Hotel in Melbourne. In subsequent public hearings, Hawke defended Australia’s intelligence community’s effectiveness. This led to the creation of an Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS), enhancing their powers akin to a royal commissioner, as per Hope’s recommendation and Hawke’s approval.
Initial Reviews by Richardson, Holloway, and Cook
Following Keating’s premiership in 1992, Dennis Richardson was enlisted to evaluate ASIO’s status post-Cold War for potential savings. This review, unlike RCASIA’s public scrutiny, was discreet and largely uncontroversial. Concerns about Soviet spies led to downsizing and staff reorganization. Additionally, Sandy Holloway assessed deficiencies in foreign intelligence collection, while Michael Cook, a former ONA director-general, was closely associated with internal security reviews.
Samuels and Codd Inquiry
In the 1990s, ASIS misconduct reports surfaced. Justice Gordon Samuels and Michael Codd conducted a review and proposed legislative oversight for ASIS, akin to ASIO’s. This initiated parliamentary deliberations on necessary responses. Revelations in 1999 about Echelon, a surveillance network operated by Five Eyes partners, accelerated the call for reform in ASIS and other intelligence agencies. Subsequently, ASIO, ASIS, and DSD were placed under the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS).
By September’s end, the parliament approved the Intelligence Services Act of 2001. This legislation brought ASIS and DSD under statutory authority for the first time. Additionally, the IGIS powers were extended to cover all six intelligence community agencies—ASIO, ASIS, DSD, DIO, ONA, and the emerging Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (AGO).
Post-Crisis Actions by Flood
In response to the East Timor crisis, the 2002 Bali bombing, and the Iraq weapons controversy in 2003, Philip Flood, a former ONA director, was assigned to review intelligence agencies in 2004. His Inquiry into Australia’s Intelligence Agencies Report exposed analytical reporting flaws and advocated for separating intelligence analysis from policy formulation, as well as augmenting resources and reinforcing ONA’s central AIC coordination role.
Cornall and Black Assessment
In compliance with Flood’s periodic review recommendation, Robert Cornall and Rufus Black led an Independent Review of the Intelligence Community (IRIC) in 2011. That same year, Kevin Rudd, the Prime Minister, established the National Security College (NSC) at the Australian National University (ANU) and appointed the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM).
Australia |
United States |
Canada |
Britain |
France |
Indonesia |
|
Chief Oversight |
✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |||
Agency-specific Officials |
✔️ | |||||
Supervisory role of ministers |
✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ | ||
Oversight by Parliament |
✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ | |
Administrative supervision |
✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ | ✔️ |
External evaluations or authorities |
✔️ | ✔️ |
Monitoring systems and responsibility frameworks in Australia, in comparison with allies and associates. Source: author.
L’Estrange & Merchant
Back in 2017, ex-chief of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and initial NSC manager, Michael L’Estrange, with ex-Defense deputy manager of intelligence and security, Stephen Merchant, were asked to take on the upcoming periodic analysis, the 2017 Independent Intelligence Review (IIR), with assistance from Sir Iain Lobban from Britain. Their analysis pointed out the growth of the Australian intelligence community with the rise of intelligence functions within various organizations such as the Australian Transactions Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, the intelligence division of the Australia Federal Police (AFP) and the intelligence function within the then Department of Immigration and Border Protection (now Home Affairs). This led to the decision to rename ONA as the Office of National Intelligence (ONI), managed by a director-general of national intelligence (DGNI) with enhanced resources and a mandate to better synchronize and supervise this expanded National Intelligence Community (NIC).
The L’Estrange Merchant report was prepared independently from the plan to establish a more extensive Home Affairs portfolio that would integrate the four latecomers to the NIC: AUSTRAC, ACIC, AFP Intel and Home Affairs Intel. This configuration was partially reversed under Prime Minister Antony Albanese, who reallocated ASIO, AUSTRAC, ACIC, and AFP to the Attorney-General’s umbrella.
Second Richardson
Having guided the reduction and subsequent rebuilding of ASIO, Dennis Richardson was summoned back to analyze the expanding body of intelligence laws, bearing in mind that the Home Affairs setups were announced concurrently with the 2017 IIR report. With ample historical insights into the performed functions, Richardson and his team detailed where significant simplification of laws would be beneficial.
And now Maude and Smith
Facing all this, Smith and Maude surely recognized that in executing their Independent Intelligence Review, they were following a well-established path of review and restructuring as highlighted here. The gradual and periodic modifications spanning over more than half a century have presented Australia with a highly accountable intelligence system of the state.
In the world of spying, the key to triumph often resides in keeping accomplishments concealed; hence, there are always limits on how revealing these agencies can be. Mindful of this, successive reviewers and administrations have acknowledged the necessity to strengthen accountability mechanisms, including parliamentary, administrative, and external ones as well as regular reports to parliament and the Australian populace. In an era of heightened foreign tampering, false information, and disinformation, the significance of these supervisory mechanisms is more crucial than ever.
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