Too dependent on summits, the Quad needs institutional foundations

The Quad has experienced periods of evolution, stagnation and even collapse since 2007. Now its members have a chance to ensure it can address the challenges of the coming decade.
With the right adjustments, the Quad can remain an impactful pillar of the regional strategic architecture. Though not an alliance, it has much to offer in terms of practical security cooperation and as a model for policy coordination in the Indo-Pacific. However, a first step is to get its house in order and build a firm institutional foundation.
As recently argued in these pages, greater institutionalisation of security partnerships can be an important tool in ensuring that cooperation can continue seamlessly across multiple changes of government and the perils of personality-driven politics.
This is an important lesson for the Quad to apply if its members want it to play an enduring role in regional security. To see why, we only need to look at the first two years of the second Trump administration.
The Quad had a bright start in 2025, receiving top billing on US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s list of meetings following President Donald Trump’s inauguration. However, there was then an extended period of radio silence between the next Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in July 2025 and its next iteration in May 2026.
The latter point marked a public re-energising of the Quad, with two more foreign ministers’ meetings in July and October 2026, and now the first leaders’ summit since September 2024 is occurring on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit this week, on 16 to 18 November.
While encouraging, this trend points to an underlying weaknesses of the Quad that needs addressing to ensure the group’s future effectiveness. Having rushed from a first officials-level meeting in 2017 to foreign ministers’ meetings in 2019 and leaders’ summits by 2021, the Quad has become too dependent on summit diplomacy for its energy and direction.
While these high-level meetings are supported by several officials-level working groups, the Quad’s effectiveness is seemingly at the mercy of its four leaders’ schedules and the demands of election campaigns.
One simple and important form of institutionalisation would be to confirm a fixed schedule of meetings, both to ensure regular consultations between the partners and to make the Quad less dependent on the delivery of standalone leaders’ summits.
The most meaningful approach would be to leverage the neutrality and convening power of the annual ASEAN Summit to host the Quad Leaders’ Summit on its sidelines, as will be the case this year. While there is a question mark over how this might be perceived by some ASEAN members, it would hearken back to the first meetings of Quad 1.0 and Quad 2.0, held at the ASEAN Summit in 2007 and 2017 respectively. It would also reinforce the members’ commitment to ASEAN centrality and emphasise their shared interests in Southeast Asia.
Though Quad-Plus initiatives have largely fallen by the wayside, the presence of other national leaders at the ASEAN Summit would also open the possibility of sideline meetings with other heads of government following Quad consultations.
A second institutional priority for the Quad should be to settle on a central vision, framework or agreement. The precise term matters less than saying what the institution is and what it aspires to be.
This would then shape its activities and initiatives, as well as how it presents to the Indo-Pacific region and the wider world. The Quad is not an alliance, but the official language of a ‘diplomatic partnership’ is a little insipid when there are ‘Quad-adjacent’ military exercises, such as Malabar and Sea Dragon, as well as cooperation in economic security, maritime domain awareness, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
Another strategic minilateral that presents an illustrative example is the Five Power Defence Arrangements between Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Britain. It was established in 1971 without a treaty but is instead based on a joint communique setting out mutual commitments, institutional arrangements and founding principles.
It has since built ministerial and chiefs of defence councils, a program of annual military exercises, coordinating committees and working groups. Its agenda has periodically evolved to keep pace with the evolving threat environment, but the core purpose and scope have remained the same for 55 years, guided by the framework laid out in the communique.
Anchoring the Quad in a set of principles, guidelines or interests would provide necessary ballast in navigating a rapidly evolving Indo-Pacific security environment. It would not prevent its members from deciding how to prioritise different initiatives or pillars within its institutional scope but instead help temper some of the more expansionist urges that left the Quad with an agenda a mile wide and an inch deep.
The Quad has no shortage of potential, despite the not insignificant challenges of managing an erratic and inconsistent Trump administration. It has delivered – and continues to deliver – on its commitments to provide practical support for Indo-Pacific countries across a broad range of policy areas. It can complement the role played by sub-regional groupings like ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum, and it has the potential to provide viable alternatives to Chinese-led initiatives.
With the right adjustments, we may yet come to see the Quad as an enduring and impactful component of the regional strategic architecture. This begins with building an institutional framework to complement these aspirations, and to build its place as a key interconnecting node that crosses sub-regions, themes and national strategies.
This article draws in part on the author’s chapter in the book Strategy and Airpower in the East and South China Sea: China, the United States, and Great Power Rivalry.
