Not there yet: Indonesia’s military has a space unit without a mandate or money
Indonesia’s military has built the organisation needed to protect its interests in outer space, including monitoring its waters. But parliament has yet to operationalise this capability.
Established in January 2026, Indonesia’s air force space unit is supposed to support space-based surveillance – or it would if only there were a statute to give it a mandate and if it had dedicated funding to develop its infrastructure. The Indonesian government should address both gaps as a priority.
Once the unit is effectively operational, Indonesia should use it to track vessels that switch off their transmitters and go dark. Australian training and data could help the unit take on that role, giving Australia a partner in monitoring vessels in Indonesian waters to its north.
Indonesia’s archipelagic waters are difficult to monitor: surface patrols cannot fully cover them, and people smugglers use them for transit and resupply on routes towards Australia. On several occasions, Chinese survey vessels went dark after entering Indonesia’s archipelagic waters. This breached the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which requires coastal states’ consent for maritime scientific research in their waters.
Data from such survey vessels has operational naval value to their owner. Space surveillance could monitor them, giving Jakarta grounds for questioning the operations – but that can’t happen until Indonesia’s space unit gets a mandate and money.
The unit is operating under the National Air Operations Command and is intended to support terrestrial military operations with space-based intelligence, surveillance, and communications. Its development runs in four stages, from 2025 to 2044, when the unit is expected to reach full capability.
The 1982 Basic Provisions of State Defence of the Republic of Indonesia assigned the Air Force to defend the national dirgantara, a term that covers both airspace and outer space. But the 2002 State Defence Law repealed the 1982 law, ending an explicit assignment of responsibility for outer space to the air force. The 2004 Indonesian Armed Forces Law and its amended 2025 version then set out the duties of each military branch, but did not restore that assignment.
The 2025 Public Policy on State Defence recognises outer space as a source of military and non-military threats. However, Indonesia’s defence doctrine lags this recognition. The 2015 strategic guidelines of the Ministry of Defence, called the Defence White Book, classify space technology as a non-military defence element, managed by agencies outside the defence sector. The ministry has issued no new edition since. The president’s policy therefore names the threat, while the ministry’s main strategic document gives the space unit no doctrinal basis.
Space-based defence operations are highly costly in terms of infrastructure and human resources. Without a legal and doctrinal basis for its role, the space unit will struggle to secure a dedicated budget. At this stage, the space unit will receive a budget allocation under the National Air Operations Command, which will be insufficient to support the unit’s infrastructure.
The space unit could have full control of data collection if it owned a surveillance satellite. Foreign or commercial data arrives according to the provider’s schedule and priorities. The unit cannot task a sensor that it doesn’t own to monitor a selected strait at a specified time. Tracking dark vessels requires repeated coverage of specific waters, which a dedicated asset secures best.
A satellite without analysts produces data and no intelligence. The unit therefore needs personnel in imagery analysis, orbital operations, space domain awareness and ground-segment engineering. These skills take years to build, so training must start before launch, Indonesia could do this in part by sending officers abroad. The Australia-Indonesia Treaty on Common Security, or Jakarta Treaty, commits both parties to cooperative security activities in areas they identify. Indonesia should propose space training as one such area. Australia’s offer to embed a senior Indonesian officer in the Australian Defence Force could be a channel for this.
Canada’s cooperation with the Philippines can be a model for monitoring dark vessels. In October 2023, those two countries signed an arrangement giving the Philippine National Coast Watch Center free access to Canada’s Dark Vessel Detection system.
Indonesia and Australia should build an equivalent program. The Jakarta Treaty already promotes cooperative security activities in areas that both parties identify. Indonesia would task its proposed satellite and analyse data through the space unit. Australia would contribute data from radio-frequency monitoring, as it does through its work with the Quad’s Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, and train analysts for Indonesia’s space unit. Joint ownership would give Indonesia control over tasking and data without basing or joint command.
Three steps should follow. Parliament should place space operations in the defence legislation; the government should fund a satellite and a training pipeline; and Canberra should offer training and cooperation in space security.
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