In nuclear diplomacy, Australia can work bilaterally, too – especially with India
The time is right for Australia to reconsider its long-held position of prosecuting nuclear non-proliferation primarily or solely through global treaties, particularly the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
That means complementing Australia’s work through global treaties with bilateral nuclear diplomacy, particularly with India, but not jettisoning long-established multilateral work.
In bilateral nuclear diplomacy, Australia should consider the pressures shaping its partners’ nuclear positions as it pursues the five steps below.
First, as a credible long-standing innovator within the global arms control machinery, Australia is positioned to influence the United States and China – though not Russia – to work on new measures for nuclear-arsenal transparency, proliferation and risk reduction. Those measures should be designed to remain effective as AI and other critical technology evolves.
Australia and close partner countries should focus on new guardrails for the nuclear weapons states. Ideally, this collaboration would involve the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council (the P-5) and at least one of the other nuclear-armed countries.
These are India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel, the latter not having declared its nuclear weapons status. North Korea and Israel would be near-impossible to get to the starting blocks and Pakistan is highly unlikely to participate with India at the table. India is a promising contender, however.
Second, when working with partner countries, Australia should focus on fundamental items already on the NPT agenda. These include transparency, crisis communications, non-attack norms for nuclear facilities, and structured dialogue on potential escalatory interaction between nuclear and non-nuclear forces.
Australia’s twin objectives are to sustain confidence in US extended deterrence and strengthen the rules and institutions that limit nuclear proliferation. Both are vital to its national interests and Indo-Pacific stability.
Thirdly, therefore, while Australian officials intensity bilateral outreach, they could also propose new ways of reviewing the NPT. After two decades of failing to secure any outcomes, a rethink of the traditional NPT Review Conference process is needed. Currently, it demands consensus on all elements of its massive agenda in one diplomatic document every five years.
Rather, Australia and close partners could devise a rolling agenda that selects the most feasible and urgent items to work through and agree on, in discrete and phased steps, throughout the decade of each Review cycle.
This would not involve India, which is not a party to the NPT. But the aim would be to signal strong adherence to – not abandonment of – the global treaty and norms that have kept the world from nuclear catastrophe for nearly six decades.
Fourth, Australia should promote the example of India and Pakistan, which have established a bilateral pact not to attack their respective nuclear facilities despite cross-border hostilities continuing. In contrast, Russia’s military attack on Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant at in 2022 was the world’s first full-scale military attack on an operational nuclear power facility.
The example of India and Pakistan should be highlighted through the established diplomatic architecture. All International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) member countries should be lobbied to support the IAEA’s current efforts for all members to pledge adherence to a new protocol disavowing attacks on nuclear plants during wars.
And fifth, Australia should double down on pressing countries to adopt the IAEA Additional Protocol, which helps detect undeclared nuclear sites. Its historical role in securing the protocol gives it high credibility to make that case.
India is a strong supporter of the IAEA and could help persuade other countries to adopt the additional protocol. The United Arab Emirates and other close partners of India could do the same.
As the US and Saudi Arabia embark on a bilateral nuclear sharing agreement and the US appears ready to pursue other similar arrangements, momentum is needed to clearly refocus world attention on the additional protocol.
Why India?
By virtue of its 2026 uranium supply agreement with India, Australia’s credibility in New Delhi is at a high point. India is an active member of the IAEA, the protocols of which underpin the new bilateral supply agreement. India has potential – and incentive – to shape new or existing norms within and outside the IAEA and the NPT.
And India has become embedded in regional arrangements championed by Australia. After a decade of halting diplomacy, India appears firmly committed to the Quad, even as it remains part of the Non-aligned Movement and appears on stage with China and Russia.
India’s standing is not diminished by doing so. Rather, its ability to engage on an equal footing with former foes, allies and new partners is now seen as befitting a rapidly rising power.
And, finally, in July 2026 Australia and India co-signed the breakthrough Joint Declaration on Defence and Security Cooperation, elevating their existing Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and acknowledging the acceleration of their strategic convergence. Thus, a bilateral calendar of foreign, defence and economic security cabinet-level discussions is in place.
This is a strong foundation on which to influence and engage India as a rising global nuclear power.
The global nuclear order has entered an unstable era since the expiry in February 2026 of the United States-Russia ‘New START’ arms limitations treaty. This instability is compounded by the continued expansion of the arsenals of almost all nine nuclear-armed and aspiring states, the growth of China’s nuclear weapons capability and mounting political and budgetary pressure on the UN institutions that underpin non-proliferation and verification.
We need to think well outside the box on nuclear risk.
The size of arsenals is not the only risk to global stability. Rather, stability is undermined by the combination of operational readiness, declining transparency and rapidly weakening habits of negotiated restraint.
Australia and India are now clearly positioned and equipped to collaborate on reshaping and re-prosecuting this agenda.
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