Bookshelf: The closing of the Russian mind (doesn’t bode well for the future)
Bookshelf: The closing of the Russian mind (doesn’t bode well for the future)
Bogged down militarily in Ukraine, with Russia’s economy in a shambles and Ukrainian drones penetrating ever deeper into the heartland and causing popular unrest, President Vladimir Putin’s position is looking increasingly tenuous. In anticipation of an eventual leadership change, Russia analysts are already busy mapping out future scenarios.
In The Closing of the Russian Mind, Andrei Kolesnikov analyses the ideological dynamics of Putinism, its effect on Russia’s role in the world and its implications for Russia’s future. Kolesnikov is a Russian journalist and former senior fellow of the Carnegie Moscow Center. He has published widely on Russian politics.
In Kolesnikov’s view, Putin has succeeded in radicalising the Russian population in support of a form of ‘chauvinistic neo-imperialism’ that relies on totalitarian methods. Many expect things to change once Putin is no longer in charge, but Kolesnikov is sceptical. As he sees it, a change in leadership is unlikely to engender broader change unless Russia undergoes profound political regeneration.
To make his case, Kolesnikov walks us through the evolution of ‘the Russian idea’, a concept that evolved over centuries and forms the basis for today’s ideology of state patriotism. The concept is based on what Russia considers its unique history, civilisation and traditionally close cooperation between the state, the Russian Orthodox church and Russian society. It is also based on the fact that Russia has nuclear weapons, and on Russians’ unabashed pride in their country’s history – including periods of violent repression.
Kolesnikov also takes the reader through the evolution of Putinism. During Putin’s first two terms as president, from 2000 to 2008, his ideology can best be described as competitive authoritarianism: there was a modicum of open elections. However, once he returned in 2012 from a hiatus as prime minister and the constitution was amended to allow him to serve until 2036, Putin tightened his grip and his regime became one of ‘hybrid totalitarianism’: elections were tightly controlled.
In addition to being wrapped up in nationalism, religion and an element of mysticism, Putinism is defined by its perception of Russia’s enemies. According to former president Dmitry Medvedev, these include ‘Ukrainian and European neo-fascists, the United States, other Anglo-Saxons and their vassals’ – about 50 ‘unfriendly’ countries in all. And their goal is the destruction of Russia.
Incited by the government, the Russian population’s anti-Western sentiment is running high. According to the Levada Center, a Russian polling and research organisation, in 2023 more than two-thirds of Russians held a negative view of the US and the European Union countries. Less than 20 percent had a positive view.
Putin has also skilfully mobilised education as a tool, rewriting history books and using school and university curricula to reinforce Russian nationalism and xenophobia. Russians’ traditionally high regard for strong leaders has recently grown. In 2016, 28 percent of respondents to a Levada poll agreed with the statement ‘Stalin is a great leader’. In 2013, the figure had almost doubled to 54 percent.
What does the future have in store?
As Kolesnikov sees it, change will only be possible once Putin leaves office. He reminds us that Russian political history is highly personalised, with the leader playing a key role. Even with Putin gone, however, change will be difficult due to the shift in mindset that has taken place over the past quarter century. Putin has been in power so long that Soviet man, Homo sovieticus, who was well-adjusted to life under the Soviet system, has been replaced by Putin’s man, Homo putinus, who is equally well-adjusted to the Russia of today: a quasi-market economy under authoritarian rule.
The post-Soviet Russian is a consumer in the capitalist sense but does not see human rights or the rotation of political power as important for everyday life. And the post-Soviet Russian does not feel empowered to press for change. Based on historical precedents, Kolesnikov sees some scope for post-Putin normalisation, possibly towards a milder form of authoritarianism. But he sees the biggest obstacle as being the ingrained mentality of the Russian people themselves.
To support his international agenda, Putin has turned the clock back to the days of the Cold War and introduced a notion of continuity between the Great Patriotic War – the term Russia uses for its participation in World War II – and the ongoing ‘special military operation’. This helps Putin to justify the war on Ukraine and places Russia’s present-day combatants on par with its veterans from eight decades ago.
In Kolesnikov’s view, this also makes the US’s Cold War policy of containment as relevant today as it was in 1946 when US foreign policy strategist George Kennan advocated for it in his renowned Long Telegram.
Kolesnikov digs deep to explain Russia’s actions and is not optimistic that the war in Ukraine will end anytime soon.
He wraps up with an old saying: In Russia you have to live a long time to see the dawn of the return of freedom. And if you live even longer, you may again witness the advent of despotism.
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