Australia’s Middle East priority should be working with those that can counter Iran
Australia’s Middle East priority should be working with those that can counter Iran
Australia needs a more active and hardheaded approach towards the Middle East to deal with ongoing conflicts stemming from or worsened by the attack against Israel three years ago today by Hamas and other Iran-backed terrorist groups.
A tougher approach is necessary because Iran and its terrorist proxies threaten Australian prosperity by choking maritime trade, undermining the law of the sea. They also stoke tensions and terrorism in Australian communities.
Australia’s priorities should be tighter domestic security and doing more with regional powers, such as the United Arab Emirates and Israel, that are willing and able to counter the threats emanating from Iran.
A more ambitious approach starts at home. Before the Bondi terrorist attack in December, the government raised the national terrorism threat level and tightened the law to counter state-sponsored terrorist networks. Iran’s use of criminal proxies to target Jews in Australia spurred this action. Iran’s likely involvement in the foiled attempt to attack US bases in Britain last month is a reminder that the threat remains.
Despite these precautions, Dennis Richardson, the former head of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, argued that more could have been done to call out antisemitism after 7 October 2023. Australians who idolised violent ‘resistance’ against Israel set the tone for the murder of Australian Jews. In its final report, due in December, the Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion must recommend how to protect Australians’ freedom to criticise Israel’s behaviour without tolerating incitement against Jews that masquerades as anti-Zionism.
Turning to diplomacy, the government has worked hard to mitigate the economic costs of Iran’s chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz. The focus has been the countries in Southeast and Northeast Asia that Australia depends on for refined fuels, fertilisers and other products made from Middle Eastern oil. Many of these countries trust Australia because it has invested decades nurturing vital strategic partnerships, such as with Singapore, South Korea and Japan. These countries also rely on Australia for food and raw materials, strengthening Canberra’s bargaining position.
Australia has compensated for its lack of heft in the Middle East by leveraging its networks and multilateral forums. Working with Jordan and others, Foreign Affairs Minister Penny Wong has led the Declaration for the Protection of Humanitarian Personnel – an initiative spurred by the mistaken killing in Gaza of Zomi Frankcom, an Australian aid worker, by the Israeli Defence Force in 2024. Two-thirds of UN member states have supported the declaration only one year after its launch. Since 2013, Australia has engaged Turkey, a key power in the Middle East, in MIKTA, a group that also includes Mexico, Indonesia and South Korea.
However, UN bandwagons and hodgepodge groups of nations tend to be limited in scope and prone to anodyne rhetoric. The declaration has not yet squarely addressed the use of human shields, including by Iran-backed terrorists. MIKTA feels more comfortable discussing global governance than specific regions. The networks that get results in the Middle East are less concerned with declarations and photoshoots.
Canberra has correctly identified the UAE, which recognises Israel, as a regional powerbroker and a bulwark against Tehran. The air-defence equipment that Australia supplied to Abu Dhabi earlier this year should anchor a deep strategic partnership. The UAE is also a valuable partner because it talks to a broad range of countries. It is a member of the BRICS, which includes Iran, as well as the I2U2 grouping, alongside India, Israel and the US.
Australia’s relationship with Iran should stay on ice until that country’s Islamist regime demonstrates that it has given up its nuclear ambitions, released its grip on the Strait of Hormuz and stopped sponsoring terrorism abroad. By strengthening its networks in the Middle East, Australia could gain insights and backchannels into Tehran. That would be better than rushing to reopen the embassy in Tehran or welcoming an Iranian ambassador back to Canberra.
The relationship in greatest need of attention is Australia’s historically close one with Israel, the most powerful Middle Eastern country, which has been strained by Israel’s unapologetically robust military response to 7 October. Canberra cannot ignore actions by Israel or its citizens that hamper the prospects for a two-state solution, such as the expansion of illegal settlements in the West Bank. But political gestures have not helped, such as Australia recognising Palestinian statehood in 2025 before the Palestinian Authority had tackled its endemic corruption.
Hectoring Israel cannot be the basis of a partnership that Australia needs for its own security and strategic interests, which include access to Israeli intelligence and military technologies. Regardless of the outcome of Israel’s national parliamentary election in November, backchannels could help restore dialogue and find ways forward. A good place to begin that process would be restarting the Be’er Sheva Dialogue, an annual high-level meeting of ministers, officials and experts that ASPI co-convened for several years, until it was shuttered by Hamas’ terrorism in 2023.
The three years since 7 October have robustly tested of Australian statecraft. Only by stepping up and becoming more hardheaded will Australia get the outcomes it needs from the Middle East in the years ahead.
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